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Federal Jurisdiction-Constitutional Law-Diversity of Citizenship
for District of Columbia and Territories
An insurance company, incorporated in the District of Columbia,
brought action in the Federal District Court for the District of Maryland. Plaintiff based its claim to federal jurisdiction on a 1940 Act of
Congress which amended the JUDICIAL CODE. 1 The District Court, refusing to accept the jurisdiction conferred by Congress in this statute,
dismissed the action on the premise that the statute grants judicial
power not authorized by the Constitution of the United States.2 This
decision was affirmed by the court of appeals, with Judge John J.
Parker dissenting, on essentially the same ground upon which the District Court relied 3 A divided Supreme Court reversed the decision of
4
the lower courts and held the 1940 Act constitutional.
The Judiciary Article of the Constitution nowhere recites that federal jurisdiction is extended to citizens of the District of Columbia or
of the territories by reason of diversity of citizenship.5 In 1792, the
Supreme Court in Hayburn's case 6 laid down the proposition that judicial
power of federal courts is derived exclusively from the Judiciary
'The 1940 Act provided that district courts have original jurisdiction of suits
of a civil nature where the matter in controversy is between citizens of different
states, "or citizens of the District of Columbia, the Territory of Hawaii, or
Alaska, and any state or territory . . . ," 54 STAT. 143 (1940). Prior to the 1940
Act the JUDICIAL CODE provided that district courts should have original jurisdiction of suits of a civil nature where the matter in controversy ". . . is between
citizens of different states . . . " and made no mention of either District of Colum-

bia or the territories. The Committee on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives, reporting the 1940 Statute, stated, "It gives to the citizens of the
District of Columbia and of Hawaii and Alaska the same right to bring a suit in a
Federal district court of any State on the ground of diversity of citizenship as

now obtains in the case of a citizen of a state." H. R. REP. No. 1756, 76th Cong.,
3rd Sess. (1940).
'No opinion filed by District Court which relied upon its former decision in
Feely v. Sidney S. Schupper Interstate Hauling System, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 663
(D. Md. 1947). Eleven Federal courts had previously considered the question.
Eight held the 1940 Act unconstitutional: Mutual Ben. Health & Acc. Ass'n. v.
Dailey, 75 F. Supp. 832 (D. Mass. 1948) ; Feely v. Sidney S. Schupper Interstate
Hauling System, Inc., 72 F. Supp. 663 (D. Md. 1947) ; Willis v. Dennis, 72 F.
Supp. 853 (W. D. Va. 1947); Wilson v. Guggenheim, 70 F. Supp. 417 (E. D. S. C.
1947) ; Central States Co-op. v. Watson Bros. Transportation Co., 165 F. 2d 392
(7th Cir. 1947) (Judge Evans dissenting); Ostrow v. Samuel Brilliant Co., 66
F. Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1946); Behlert v. James Foundation, 60 F. Supp. 706
(S. D. N. Y. 1945); McGarry v. Bethlehem, 45 F. Supp. 385 (E. D. Pa. 1942).
Contra: Duze v. Wooley. 72 F. Supp. 422 (D. Hawaii 1947); Glaeser v. Acacia
Mut. Life Ass'n., 55 F. Supp. 925 (N. D. Cal. 1944); Winkler v. Daniels, 43 F.
Supp. 265 (E. D. Va. 1942).
' National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 165 F. 2d 531 (4th Cir.
1947).
'National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 1173 (1949);
Siegmund v. General Commodities Corp., 175 F. 2d 952 (9th Cir. 1949).
' See U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, §2. Citizens of the District of Columbia and the
territories have always had federal jurisdiction on grounds other than diversity
of citizenship. See DOME, FEDERAL PROCEDURE 186 n. 43 (1928).
62 DalI. 409 (U. S. 1792).
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In 1804, Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Hepburn v. Ellzey8
supplemented this proposition with the hypothesis that the term "states,"
as used within that Article, excludes the District of Columbia and the
territories.9 Messrs. Justices Jackson, Burton and Black in the majority opinion, while affirming the construction placed on the term "states"
by Mr. Chief Justice Marshall, reached the conclusion that the Judiciary
Article of the Constitution is not the exclusive source of judicial power
for federal courts. In direct conflict with the conception stated in Hayburn's case, supra,they found the requisite authority to sustain the 1940
statute elsewhere in the Constitution. The late Messrs. Justices Rutledge and Murphy, on the other hand, in a concurring opinion affirmed
the proposition set forth in Hayburn's case; and by defining the term
"states" to include the District of Columbia and the territories, they
overruled the opposite construction by Chief Justice Marshall in Hepburn v. ElIzey and held the 1940 Act valid.'
These divergent positions favoring the validity of the 1940 Act are
necessarily supported by independent arguments. First,the unusual preciseness of terminology of the provisions and the great talent of the
drafters emphasize that if the authors had desired Article III of the
Constitution to be the exclusive source of federal judicial power, they
would have so stated. They did not. On the contrary, in Articles I
and IV of the Constitution they conferred blanket power upon Congress
over the citizens of the District of Columbia and the territories, including power over the judicial function." From this grant of judicial
power it is inferred that Congress may enlarge the jurisdiction of any
federal court to that extent necessary to protect the rights of these citi"Gordon v. United States, 117 U. S. 697 (1864); United States v. Ferreira,
13 How. 40 (U S. 1851) ; Hodgson and Thompson v. Bowerbank, 5 Cranch 303
(U. S. 1809) ; cf., Mayor v. Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252 (U. S. 1867) ; Sheldon v.
Sill, 8 How. 441, 449 (U. S. 1850) ; Mossman v. Higginson, 4 Dall. 12, 14 (U. S.
1800).
'2 Cranch 445 (U. S. 1804).
' New Orlans v. Winter, 1 Wheat. 91 (U. S. 1816); Barney v. Baltimore, 6
Wall. 280 (U. S. 1868) ; Hooe v. Jamieson, 166 U. S. 395 (1897) ; In re Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 482 (1905); cf., Watson v. Brooks, 13 F. 540 (C. C. Ore.
1882) (doctrine criticized).
"0Six of the justices favored the doctrine in Haybums Case, including Justices
Rutledge, Murphy, Frankfurter, Reed, Vinson and Douglas. Seven of the justices
favored the construction in Hepburn v. ElIzey, including Justices Jackson, Burton,
Black, Frankfurter, Reed, Vinson and Douglas. The decisison resulted from the
fact that five of the justices, Jackson, Burton, Black, Rutledge and Murphy, concurred in result, though they disagreed on the basis-for the result.
" U. S. CoNsT. Art. I, §8, cl. 9 states that Congress shall have power to constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court; U. S. CONsT. Art. I, §8, cd. 17
gives Congress power "to exercise exclusive legislation in all cases whatsoever,
over such district . . . as may . . . become the seat of the government of the
United States . . ."; U. S. CONST. Art. IV, §3, cl. 2 gives Congress power "to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory ...
belonging to the United States . . ."; U. S. CONsT. Art. I, §8, cl. 18 gives Congress power to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into execution these powers.
7
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zens.1 The extension of diversity jurisdiction is a valid and reasonable
exercise of this power.' 3
Second, by defining "states" to include the District of Columbia and
the territories for the purpose of diversity jurisdiction, the source of
judicial power remains the Judiciary Article of the Constitution. Further, the changing needs of a growing nation have undermined the
foundation of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall's holding in Hepburn v.
Elizey that the term "states" does not include the District of Columbia
and the territories for diversity purposes. That holding is now supported only by its great age and the prestige of Chief Justice Marshall's
name, and it should now be overruled as the simplest way to achieve an
admittedly fair objective.
Both of these arguments are bolstered by a practical consideration.
If diversity jurisdiction for citizens of states is desirable, which has
been questioned,' 4 it would seem equally desirable to make that jurisdiction available to citizens of the District and the territories. By the
1940 Act these citizens, when no other basis for federal jurisdiction is
available, are made eligible to sue citizens of states in federal courts
instead of being compelled to sue in state courts. This is the principal
advantage granted by the Act to the citizens in question. Concededly,
this result may be accomplished by creation of special statutory courts
to hear these cases.' 5 Instead, Congress adopted the less expensive and
more practical expedient of vesting that jurisdiction in existing federal
courts. The means is justified in accomplishing an end admittedly
within the power of Congress.
The dissenting justices, Messrs. Frankfurter, Reed, Vinson and
Douglas, would continue unimpaired both the proposition of Hayburn's
case and the construction of the term "states" in Hepburn v. Elizey.
Their argument for the invalidity of the Act proceeds on the theory
1 This construction is not without implied judicial sanction. E.g., judges of
courts of the District" of Columbia (which were created under U. S. CoNsT. Art. I,
§8) come under the protection of U. S. CoNsT. Art. III, §1. O'Donoghue v.

United States, 289 U. S. 516 (1933). Judgments of the courts of the District are
to be accorded "full faith and credit" under U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, §1. Embry
v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 3 (1882). Congress may impose a direct tax on the District
of Columbia, but not an oppressive tax, by reason of U. S. CoNsr. Art. I, §2.
Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317 (U. S. 1820).

2 C. J. Marshall gave color to this interpretation in a statement in Hepburn
v. Ellzey, 2 Cranch 445, 453 (U. S. 1804) made in reference to lack of diversity
jurisdiction for citizens of the District: ". . . this is a subject for legislative, not

for judicial consideration (italics supplied)."

1, See Mr. Frankfurter, Distribution of Judicial Power between United States
and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L. Q. 499, 525 (1928) : "The various types of diver-

sity litigation call for concrete scrutiny in the light of present day conditions and

the demands upon federal courts by peculiarly federal litigation. The right to remove to the federal court a litigation between two non-residents in a state court

will not survive analysis."
"*U. S. CONsT. Art. I, §8, cls. 17 and 18 (District of Columbia); U. S.
CONST.

Art. IV, §3, cI. 2 (territories).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

19491

that (a) the Judiciary Article is the exclusive source of federal jurisdiction, and (b) the Article does not provide for federal diversity
jurisdiction over citizens of the District of Columbia and the territories.
They contend that the language of Article III is explicit ;16 the authors
were distinguished lawyers capable of scrupulously exact draftsmanship;
the subject-matter is technical; each facet of judicial power authorized
was contested among the framers and distinctly circumscribed ;17 and it is
manifest, on the one hand, that Article III was not intended to be one
of those sections to which time and experience were to give content,
and, on the other hand, that it was to be the sole source of federal
judicial power. Article III does not purport to authorize federal diversity jurisdiction for citizens of the District of Columbia or the territories; nor is there any indication that the term "states" means anything
other than those component parts forming the union which alone have
the power to amend the Constitution.' 8 From these premises it follows
that an act of Congress attempting to grant federal judicial privileges
to the citizens in question violates the Judiciary Article of the Constitution and is invalid. Buttressing the logical argument is the practical
consideration that the detriment which will result from holding the Act
valid outweighs the advantages which will accrue to citizens of the District and the territories. The already overheavy workload of the federal
courts will be increased. More serious is the possibility that Congress
might use the precedent now established to further extend federal jurisdiction to include other duties heretofore considered precluded by the
Judiciary Article.1 Though it may be desirable to assure to all citizens access to federal courts on an equal basis, that end would be
20
better achieved by more appropriate means.
Since the Supreme Court has upheld the 1940 Act it is pertinent to
consider its wording in conjunction with the 1948 revision of this statute.

" The precise phraseology of U. S. CoNsT. Art. III is in striking contrast with
phrases dealing with other vital aspects of government; e.g., "due process of
law," "commerce . . . among the several states," "necessary and proper."
" See Madison's defense of the Judiciary Article before the Virginia Convention, 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 216-225 (Hunt. ed. 1900).

"In Hepburn v. Elizey, 2 Cranch 445, 453 (U. S. 1804), C. J. Marshall in
construing the first judiciary Act to exclude citizens of the District of Columbia
said: ". . . members of the American Confederacy only are the states contemplated in the Constitution."
Justice Frankfurter asks: "... if the precise enumeration of cases as to which

'"

Article III authorized Congress to grant jurisdiction to the United States District
Courts does not preclude Congress from vesting these courts with authority which
Article III disallows, by what rule of reason is Congress to be precluded from
bringing to its aid the advisory opinions of this Court or of the Court of Appeals? .. . Why is not Congress justified in conferring original jurisdiction upon
this Court in litigation involving the exercise of its power to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper . . . " National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer
Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 1173. 1196, 1197 (1949).
20A constitutional amendment and special statutory courts offer alternative
solutions.
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The 1940 Act changed the JuDIcLA CODE to provide that district courts
have original jurisdiction of all suits of a civil nature where the matter
in controversy ". . is between citizens of different states, or citizens
of the District of Columbia, the Territory of Hawaii, or Alaska, and
21
Objections have been advanced that
...
any state or territory.
the Act is ambiguous and subject to several interpretations. 22 The
1948 revision 23 differs from the 1940 act on the question of federal
diversity jurisdiction in two respects. 24 The words, "or citizens of
the District of Columbia, the Territory of Hawaii, or Alaska, and any
state or territory," are omitted. The word "states," as used in the
section, is defined to include "the territories and the District of Columbia." The 1948 revision leaves unchanged the basis upon which the
Supreme Court reached their decision in the principal case. The Court
2
referred to the 1948 revision as, in substance, re-enacting the 1940 Act. 5
The result of the 1940 Act as revised and construed is that the
citizens of the District of Columbia and the territories, on a showing
of diversity of citizenship between the parties, may sue in the federal
courts. Nevertheless, by means of a splitting of opinions, 20 the conception of the Judiciary Article as the exclusive source of federal judicial
power and the limited construction of the term "states," as used in that
Article, considered individually, remain intact. While the basis is as
yet unsanctioned by legal principal approved by a majority of the justices, the Court by the purely mechanical device of a split majority
accomplished the result they desired without the delay of a constitutional
amendment or the complications attendant upon the creation of separate
special courts.
CLYDE T. ROLLINS.

Sales-Technical Cash Transaction-Vendor's Right to Recover
Property from Bona Fide Purchaser
Unless a contrary intention appears, promises for an agreed exchange which may be simultaneously performed are concurrently conditional. 1 It follows that, in a contract for the sale of a chattel where
11 54 STAT. 143 (1940). Italics supplied.
22A literal reading of the 1940 Act would indicate that, contrary to U. S.
CONsT. AMEND. XI, citizens of the District, Hawaii, and Alaska were authorized
to sue any state or territory in the district courts. The Act seemingly authorized
suits between two citizens of one territory in the federal courts. See McGarry
F. Supp. 385 (E. D. Pa. 1942).
v. City of Bethlehem, 45(1948).
2228 U. S. C. §1332
2,The revision removes the objection relating to a possible violation to U. S.
CoNsr. AMEND. XI. The revision precludes federal jurisdiction over suits between two citizens of one territory.
2 National Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 69 Sup. Ct. 1173, 1174
(1949).

" Se note 10, supra.
I RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS

§267 (1931).

